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El presente art ículo estudia un episodio concreto en el proceso que transformó las notaciones algcbr<licas 
de los s iglos. XVI y XVII en un poderoso lel/8l1ajefo /"llw l. En c lmiSrlIO se comparan [as ideas de Wallis 
y de Condill ac sobre la nat uraleza de l álgebra con e l objeti vo de entender las direrenc ias ent re el 
todopoderoso lcnguaj l: al gebraico de las prime",s déc:ldas del siglo XV III y las limllacioncs inherentes 
a las notaciones algebra icas del siglo XV II . Oc forma particular. se \':llora a{luí el papel dcscmpcñ:tdo por 
el elemento gráfico de las notaciones a lgebra i ca.~ , así como su si metría en algunos casos particulares. en 
la manera corno Wallis entendí;. el poder dc maslrali\'o de las notaciones algcbmicas. El art ículo arguye 
que la debilidad del álgebr.! qua lenguaje fonnal en Wallis es consistente con la imponancia que él le acorda· 
ha como instnullenlo de descubrimiento. T ambién es consistente con la opini6n de Wallis que el álgcbr.t 
no alter.! de forma subs tancial las demostraciones clásicas. Finalmen te. }' quizá de forma más impor-
tante. esta debilidad también es consistente con la idea q ue el álgebra sólo era ul1:1t:lquigrnfía que "con-
dcnS:lba" los argumentos mate máticos y ··Ios mostraba en una sola mirada", 
The present artide focuses on a specific stage in the process th rough which algebraic nota-
tions became a powerful formal language , The artide compares the views of Condillac and 
Wallis on the nalure of algeb,·a as a way to understand t he differcnces between the all 
powerful algebraic language ofthe first dccadcs of the 18th century and t he limitations of 
17th-ccntury algebraic nota tions. In particular, it considers the role t he gru phical elcment 
of algebraic nota tions, and their syrnrnetry in sorne specific cases, pl ayed in John Wallis's 
understunding of the demonstrative power of the algebraic notations , It !:Ihows that the 
wcakness of Wallis's algebra qua formal languagc i5 fu lly consistcnt with his emphas is on 
algebra as a tool of di 5covery. It is also consistent with Wullis's view that algebra does not 
produce "new" demonstrations, 01' that algebra does not alte,' the substance of the cl assical 
demonstrations, Fina11y, and perhaps more significantly, 8uch a weakness is also consislent 
wit,h the notion lhut algebra was but a lachigraphy that "condensed" mathematica l argu-
ments and "ofl'cred t hem at one glance", 
lntroduction 
The present article facuses on a specific stage in t he process through which algehraic notations became a powerful formal language. In 
particula r, it considers the role the graphical element of algebraic nota-
tians, and their symmetry in sorne specific cases, played in Wallis's under-
s tanding of the demonstrative power of the algebraic language. As is well 
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known, John Wallis (1616-1703), one ofthe staunchest defenders ofthe 
then novel "algehraic style", was one of the mathematicians most innov-
ative in using algebra. As we shall see, Wallis did not have at his di s-
posal a self-sustaining algebraic language, that is to say, one that could 
fuJ1y sustain formal 01' symbolic deductions. On the other hand, Wallis's 
algebraic notations had strength (even from a deductive point of view) 
derived from considerations of syrnmetry and graphical suggestiveness. 
Two questions must be previously discussed in order to clarify the con-
text of Wallis's contributions. One concerns the usual view that sees 
algehra and algehraic notations as antagonistic to geometry during the 
17th century. The second one concerns the very notion of algebraic lan-
guage as it took shape and consistency in the first decades of the 18th cen-
tury. We shall start by addressing these two preliminary points and then 
will concentrate in Wallis's understanding of algebra and his use of the 
a lgebraic "style". 
The complicated relationship between algebra and geometry sustained 
t hroughout the seventeenth century is usually portrayed in terms of 
conflict, struggle, and opposition. As Morris IGine famously said, in the 
17th century "algebra did rise above the limitations imposed by geo-
metric thinking". Until quite recentIy most historians of mathematics 
saw 17th-centul'y geometry as a constraint, an ohstacle, and a residue of 
the pasto Interestingly, the language of "freedom" is quite common to 
oppose algebraic to geometric styles and arguments, Thus, according to 
Kline, Wallis played a crucial role "in freeing arithmetic and algebra 
from geometric representation" (Kline, 1972 : 279, 281). In the last few 
years, having realized the complexity ofthe rnany ways in which algehra 
was Enked to geometry during the 17th century, historians of mathe-
matics have revised the foregoing view. Yet, someho\V the basic idea of the 
confrontation between rivals remains. Somehow, it is still being sug-
gested that algebra and geometry could hardly coexist-that it was all one 
01' the other. To quote from a competent, very recent book on the history 
of 17th-century a lgebra: 
Hobbes and Barrow were on the losing side of one of the most impor-
tant mathematical battles of thei r century-that pitting the new alge-
braists against mathematicians linked ... to the geometric tradition of 
Western mathematics. (Pycior, 1997 : 166). 
Although this old cliché contains sorne truth (as all clichés do), it must 
be thoroughly revised. In rny view, rather than two con flicting views 
about the purpose and the actual working of 17th-century mathemat-
¡es, geometry and algebraic analysis were rather two layers of the math-
ematical ruscourse. As we shall see today, the rise of symbolic algebra in 
the second half ofthe 17th century provides more evidence of the foun-
dational role geometry that was still playing then in the work of the 
most advanced algebraists. 
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The "language" of algebra in the early Enlightenm,ent 
With a few exceptions on minor points, the formal system of a lgebraic 
symbols stabilizes and practically acquires its final modern form (even 
in terms of graphical solutions and conventions) by the end of the firs t 
third ofthe 18th century. Even more important, it \Vas by then gene ra lly 
and explicitly recognized as a language. By lhen , "analysis" (in the par-
ticular sense so \Vel! desclibed by Marco Panza, Craig Fraser, and others) 
was a lmost coextensive with mathematics, and the language of alge-
braic symbols was the only one (almost) all mathematicians used.1 By 
then, it had become commonplace that "algebraic" 01' "analytic" demon-
strations (meaning demonstrations involving but the manipu lation of 
a lgebraic symbols according to form al rules, like for instance demon-
strating that (a ± b)2 = a2 + b2 ± 2ab by the formal product of a ± b by 
itselD were more direct, more evident, more general, more rigorous, and 
in all senses to be preferred to a geometrical proof. Proc1aimed in many 
places and ways, the view that algebra was more general, abstract, and 
fundamental than geometry was given pride 01" place in D'Alembert's 
authoritative "Preface" to the Encyclopédie (1750) (D'A1embert, 1750 : v-
viii ), That s uch a programmatic and carefully constructed text as 
D'Alembert's "Preface" dealt with this particula r issue in the philoso-
phy of mathematics should wam us about its novelty and about ho\V 
important it \Vas for the philosophy of science of the Enlightenment. 
In fact, the fundamental role accorded in the 18th centw-y to the algebraic 
language as \Vell as the 18th-century idenlification ofmathematics with 
"analysis" both came hand in hand with a new philosophy of kno\Vledge 
and a new philosophy of language. Highly characteristic of the science of 
the Enlightenment, such novel views on knowledge and language found 
their more popular and cogent expression in the works ofEtienne Bonnot 
de Condillac (1715-1780). As is well known , Condillac provided system-
a tic express ion to Locke's views while complementing them with hi s 
own insights, He was the best and most influential expositor of empiri-
cal sensation a lism, and something like the official philosopher of the 
French philosophes.2 Condillac argued that whatever \Ve kno\v (eithel' 
abou t the materia l \Vorld, about hum a n nature, 01' about any othel' 
I Sec r~raser (1989), Fraser (1997), Panza (1997). 
2 His most influential works appcarcd around lhe middlc of lhe cen tury: Essai Sllr I'origine 
des cOlUwissDrl ces humaines (l746), Traite des s)'stemes (1749), and Traité des sensatiolls 
(1754). His ideas about language and thoughL «(jI'sL publi shed in the Essai sur l'origine des 
corlllaiBsances hllmaines) appeared in condensed form in La logique (1780). He dcveloped 
Lhem in his La lallgue des calculs (Condillac, 1981), which he left unfini shed and was pub-
li shed only posthumously, QUI' qllotations come fl"om &t logique 00 account of both , its hav-
ing a more finished form, and its representing Condi llac's first and en l"liel" views ofthe first 
decades ofthe 18th ccntury. There ís no good accoulll ofCondillac's \ife and work, but see 
G. Le Roy's "In t roduction" to his edition of OCllure¡; philosophiqllc:; de CoruLillac, 3 vol. 
(Paris: P,U.F. , 1947-195 1); Gillispie, 1960) : 163-9; Ha lli e, 1967; Knob1och, 1980: AarslctT, 
1982a. 
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dom ain) is known through ideas in our minds that ultim ately originate 
in the sensations pereeived by our bodily senses. Our knowledge is but 
the result of analyzing our ideas, whieh meant findin g how they a re 
eomposed of more simple ideas - he provided the example that we fully 
know or "understand" a machine when we can disassemble it in its con-
stituent gears, rods, screws, etc. so as to be able to recomposing \Vith 
them the original machine. Similarly, understanding a difficult, com-
plex idea meant isolating and identifying the simple ideas eompound-
ing it. Sorne ideas, like the one we identify and represent by the word 
"force", cannot be c1early represented te the imagin ation. Nonetheless, we 
can effectively and rigol'ously use it once we analyze it and know exact-
Iy the rapports it keeps with other ideas (like mass, aeeeleration, etc). It 
is not necessary to know the real material essence ofour ideas (we may 
never know exactly what "forces" are in th emselves, fOI" example), since 
all we need ls to know how rorces work, that is to say theil" exact reJa-
tionships to other ideas (Condillae, 1780 : 378-83). In other words, the 
relationshjp of ou!" ideas to the "real" things in the material world that 
eorrespond to them is bound to be problematie. 
Sinee we may find impossible to discover the real nature of many things 
(of whieh me neveltheless have elear ideas), the essential tool for handling 
and analyzing OUl" ideas is the words that identify them in out" minds 
and the rules \Ve have to combine and relate words. Hence, the Clucial role 
the philosophy of seienee of the Enlightenment aeeords to language, and 
the particularly crucial role algebraic language assumes within mathe-
maties dUl-ing the Enlightenment.3 Condill ae elaims that \Ve on ly think 
through words, and that a11 philosophicaJ errors come from the misuse 
of words - most usually from the use of wO l"ds whose meaning has not 
been properly ela rified (Condillae, 1780 : 394). Reasoning star ted with 
language, and the art of reasoning (which i5 in essence equivalent to 
the a rt of analyzing) progresses just in the measure in whieh languages 
do. \Vithout a good, improved language, we can neither analyze ow· ideas 
nor analyze the sensory inputs from which our ideas aJ·ise. Words are 
signs for our ideas. We deal ,vith ideas through words, whieh is the only 
way we can handle them (ibid : 396, 397). 
Condillac criticizes prevlous philosophies ofl anguage fOI" not recogniz-
ing the erueial!"ole words play in our thinking. Unti l then, aeeording to 
him , words had been considered mere instruments fOI" the communi-
calion of thoughts, but not part and parcel of the activi ty of thinking. 
Tha t is, thinking had been supposed to be previous to, ind ependent 
from, and aboye its linguistic expression. According to Condillac, how-
ever, the art of well reasoning is nothing but the art oC speaking COI'-
reetly (ibid : 399, 400, 401). Henee, the foremost impo!"tanee of a well 
!I Scc GiII ispic (1960), p. 169·72, 233-50; Ridcr (990), Beretln (1993 ), p. 27-59 . 
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designed and well articulated language for philosophical investigations 
-and th e secondary role imagination plays in th em (ibid : 402 ). 
CondiIlac also criticizes the prominent role previously accorded to def-
initions and to the synthetic or deductive organization of knowledge, 
which he attributed to the influence of classical geometry. Not even for 
teaching purposes is the axiomatico-deductive organi zation to be rec-
ommended, according to him. Its order is only apparent, s ince it is an 
artificial one invented by philosophers, not one arising from the actual 
investigation and discovery of truths; it tires the rnind without in any 
way illuminating it (ibid : 403-5). 
Condillac is nowadays credited with having substantially contributed 
to modern theories of language by stressing the intimate connection 
between language and thought (Aarsleff, 1982b). He was essentiaUy cor-
rect in pointing out that Aristotelian , medieval, and 17th-century ratio-
nalist theories of language aU agreed in taking language to be the expres-
sion of already existing logical structures. According to such views (pre-
sent, for instance, in Arnauld's influential Logique), words were signs 
somehow fitted to already developed ideas , and language expressed 
a lready formulated judgments. Words were unavoidable for communi-
cation (and thereby they were attached to ideas), hut if anything, words 
were the source of confusion and elTor in our thoughts.4 In accol'dance 
with then prevalent theories of language, in 1634 the mathematician 
Pi erre Herigone ({l . 1630-1640) advocated a radical reform ofthe math-
ematical style that incorporated a huge measure of new algebraic nota-
tions. He claimed that his aim was to liberate mathernatics froro the 
ambiguities and confusion of alllanguages whatever: "i'ay inventé une 
nouveUe methode de fa ire les demonstrations, briefve et intell igible, 
sans l'usage d'aucune langue".5 We will return below to this opposition 
of algebra and language typical of the seventeenth century. 
Condillac ended hi s Logique by crowning the a lgebraic language king 
ofthe philosophicallanguages and recommending that as far as possible 
all sciences should adopt it (ibid : 407-8). Algebra ic expressions show 
transparently all the links between the different magnitudes relevant 10 
the problem. Algebraic proofs move from step to step in a long chain oC 
connected expressions in which we find aIl the clarity and evidence that 
philosophical arguments might ever achieve. Algebra, claims Condillac, 
is not (as sorne mathematicians say) "similar" to, or Usort of' a language, 
but is in itself a real language that translates reasonings that use words 
into chains of formal expressions in which letters and others symbols 
occupy the place ofwords. Algebra is both an analytic method and a lan-
.¡ See, fOI" in stance, Amau ld, Nicole (1662), p. 40-1, 42-3, 83, 103-'1. 
5 Hcrigone 0634-42), 1, unnumbcred preface "Ad Icctorem I Au lecteurn , p. [2]. On Hcrigone, 
see Folkerts, Knobloch , Rcich (cds.) (2001), pp. 13f. 
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guage. Al I la nguages a re a na lytic methods if properly constituted , but 
algebra, being the more precise and well ar ticula ted of a ll existing la n-
guages, is the best of a ll available a nalytic methods (ibid) . 
Such a n understanding of the st a tus a nd a podictic power of the formal 
la nguage of a lgebra was indeed new. In t he last decades of the seven-
teenth century, the foundations of algebraic operations were either taken 
for granted a nd not properly di scussed (that was essent ia lly Wallis's 
position) 0 1' else th ey were explicitly gl'Ounded on geometric objects and 
results. The crucial role of the geometric referent fOl" algebraic opera-
t ions is most evident in the Essai de Logique that the natura l philosopher 
Edme Ma riotte (c. 1620-1684) wrote in coLlabora tion with Roberval (pub-
Iished in 1678). Here Mariotte c1a ims that s ince a lgebra ic operations 
are grounded on propositions [rom al-ithmetic and geometry, algebra 
cannot prove basic propositions of ari thmetic 0 1" geometry -lest we faH 
in a circular situation. Ris main example is the square ofthe binomial, 
(a - b)2, where the product of -b by itself is taken te be pl us b2. He cri t-
ieizes the usual arguments provided to justify that minus times minus 
is plus fOl" not being general, nOI" cogent enough; the argu ment based on 
grammar, fO I" instan ce, does not apply to the French language, and other 
arguments are mere analogies devoid of mathematical content: 
"TI est á remarquer que la plíipalt des operations de l'Algebre sont fondées 
sur des propositions de Geometrie et d'Arithmetique; et que par con se-
quent on ne peut pas demontrer par ces operations, les mes mes propo-
sitions qui leur ont servy de pl'euve; . .. En voicy un exemple . On trouve 
par le calcul de I'Algebre, que [(A - B)2 ; A' + B' - 2ABl ... , et 1'0n prend 
dans ce ca lcul B', pour le produi t de -B par -B, ... ce qui est for t sur-
prenant; ... Quelques-uns dissent que cela procede, de ce que deux nega-
tions valent une affirmation; mais c'est une Regle de Grammaire, qui 
est mesme fa usse dans la Grarnrn aire Fran\!oise; et dans ce calcu1 , on 
ne nie poi nt, mais on multipUe. D'autres disent, que moins rnoins vaut 
autant que plus plus; ce qui est inconcevable, bien loin d'estre clair et évi-
dento JI est done necessaire de prouver la bonté de cette operation, puis 
qu'elle ne s'établi pas d'elle·mesme. La preuve s'en fait par la septiéme 
du second des Elemens d'Eucl ide". (Mariott e, 1992 : 82-3). 
He concludes that the only proof deserving such a name is by Proposition 
7, Book II ofEuc1id's Elemenls (lV181;otte (1992), p. 82-3). This proposition 
demonstrates that the square of any Ene plus the sqllare of sorne part of 
it equals the square of the remaining part plus twice the rectangle whose 
s ides a re the whol e a nd th e pa rt (see F igure 1). This proposit ion is th e 
on ly way to explain why - B squarc eqllals B square: '4 c'est la raisan 
pour Jaque lle il fa ut prendre B' pOllr le produit de - B pa r - B" (Mariotte 
(1992), p. 83). 
To our eyes and mi nds, already well used to the existence of formallan-
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Fib>Ure 1. Euc1id's Elemel/ts, Book 1I , Propos ition 7 
• 
Proposition 11 7 ofthc ElemclIls proves that A2 + B2 = (A - B)2 + 2AB by means ofthc diu-
gram nbove. 
guages made up of abstraet symbols, and to the power of the algebraie lan-
guage, the mere creation and use of algebraic symbols may 100 k equi v-
alent to the creation of a new mathematicaJ language, new mathemat-
¡cal objects and new standard s of pl'oof. Yet, as this trivial example 
demonstrates it is one thing to in troduce algebraic symbols (even if 
accompanjed with precise rules for handling them), and a very differ-
ent thing to turn them into a self-sustaining language -that is to say, a 
language that is able to support by itself (without having reeourse to 
geometrie objects and reslllts) the weight of mathematieal demonstrations. 
In other words, this example suggests that the so-ea lled algebraie "style" 
ofthe 17th eentury eoexisted with a philosophy ofmathematies in whieh 
geometry kept a fundamental role- fundamental in a literal as well as 
in a metaphorical sen se. We will examine now this intennediate stage in 
the development of the notion of algebraic "Ianguage" by looking into 
John Wallis's understanding of its nature. 
Wallis on algebra 
Sorne of the prominent features in Condillac's praise fOl" algebra are 
already in John Wallis. Wallis stressed that diseovel"y and pl"Oof go along 
separate ways. Although he did not explieitly identify diseovery with 
--------
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analysis, his defense of the greater relevanee of diseovery over synthet -
ic presentation and demonstrations (on whieh more below) is fully con-
sistent with Condil1 ac's. According to Walli s, algebra was (among other 
things) the art of resolving 01' "dissolving" what is supposed to be com-
pounded or made up (Wal1is, 1685 : 1). This inc\uded prominently a the-
ory of equations whose main purpose \Vas the "eomputation and man-
agement of proportion" in an abstraet, general way.6 Between the two 
authors, however, we find substantial and highly revealing difTerenees 
that concern as mueh their philosophy of algebra as their understanding 
of the historieal development of the subject, and even Wallis's views on 
sorne ethieal implieations derived from speeifie mathematieal styles. 
For one thing, Wallis's praise of a lgebra as a tool of discovery was ambigu-
ous in its historieal s ignificance. Condillae explicitly critieized classieal 
thinkers and mathematicians for having a poorer language and a less 
sophisticated methodology than the ones he was promoting. He \Vas a 
man of the Enlightenment, looking forward to an unending materia l, 
moral, and scientific progress, and looking down onto an unsophistieat-
ed past unaware of the right method in philosophy. To Walli s, on t he 
other hand, the past was still important to legitimize algebra and alge-
braic demonstrations. Following Viete, Oughtred, and most early users 
of algebraic symbols, Wallis presented algebra as an "rut of invention" that 
had in all probability an ancient pedigree. In many places ofhis Treatise 
ar Algebra, Wallis sets forth his view that the mathematicians of the 
past did knaw of and used sorne secret method of discovery: 
"It is to me a thjng unquestionable, That the Ancients had somewhat 
oflike nature with our AJgebra, from whence many of their pralix and 
intricate Demonstrations were derived . ... But this their Art of Invention, 
they seem very studiously to have concealed". (WaJJjs, 1685 : [2], 3). 
He a l so drew a sort of chronology of the transmission of sueh secret art: 
rrom the most ancient civilizations oflndia a lgebra carne to the Perses, 
from them to the Arabs, who used it before the ancient Greeks. From 
the Al'abs, by means of the "Saracens and Moors" it went to Spain, and 
hence to England (how ol' who moved it from the Iberian peninsula to 
England, he does not say) (Wallis (1685), p. [2], 4). So Wallis promotes 
algebra beca use of its heuristic power, and because he deems discovery 
to be more important than proof (more about this below), but he pro-
motes it under the exam ple, so to speak, of the great mathematicians 
ofthe pasto 
6 Walli s highly praiscd Thomas Harl;ol for showing how equations of higher dcgrccs we re 
composcd or made up offirst-dcgree equations nnd othcr "more simple equations" (Walli s 
somehow misrepresented and magnified Harriot's contribution, but thi s is certainly irrel-
evam. here). This was "the grcat key that opens the mosL abstruse mysterics in algcbra". See 
Wallis (1685), p. 198-9. 
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Walljs's praise for algebra gets undeniable moral overtones. As rus ref-
erences to the "secrets concealed" by the mathematicians of the past 
suggest , Wallis takes for granted that mathematici ans not only may 
wish to conceal their working methods but actually do conceal t hem. 
There is an explicit moral reproach in WaUis's attack on the classical, 
elaborate, geometrical demonstrations by reduction to absurdity, and in 
his praise for the a lgebraic style: this is a "humbler" \Vay of practicing 
mathematics beca use it pl'ovides ways and mean s that may help readers 
in making mathematical discoveries . Wallis criticizes classical mathe-
maticians who made public only prolix and intricate geometrical dernon-
strations that rest on "the Pompous ostentation of Lines and Figures" 
(Wallis, 1685 : 3, 298). 10 a highly interesting passage, he uses a mechan-
ical metaphor. Quoting Pedro Nunes, who had quoted Aristotle, Wallis 
identified such classical mathematicians to the technicians of old t imes 
\Vho contri ved marvelous machines "but [didJ conceal the Artifice [mak-
ing the machines runJ, to make them the more admired" (Wallis, 1685 : 
3). Wallis used metaphorically mechanical m achines to suggest that 
there may be a hidden trick in demonstrations that look difficult, and to 
illustrate the message that the reader should not unduly admire dis-
coveries that may seem out ofthe powers ofordinary persons. Condjllac 
used the same image of a mechanical machine but to make quite a gen-
eral epistemological point, not a moral one. Rather than a predecessor of 
Condillac, Wallis seems to be here a successor of Francis Bacon, who 
had opposed terse and honest scientific prose to the ornate, pompous, 
and contrived style that bides rather than conveys the author's meaning. 
As is well known, this bighly popular idea in the early years of the Royal 
Society found expression in such \Vorks as J ohn Wilkins's Essay /owards 
a Real Charac/er and Philosophical Language (1668) and Thomas Sprat's 
History oi the Royal Sacie/y (1667).7 
According to Wallis, the most relevant feature of the algebraic style (one 
on \Vbich he insisted in different places ofhis 'I}eatise) was the "short and 
conv eni ent way of Notation; whereby the whole process of ma ny 
Operations is at once exposed to the Eye in a short SynopSiS."B That is to 
say, Wallis's a lgebraic "language" was a shOlthand-like set of signs rather 
than a ttue formal language. He praised and adopted Oughtred's numer-
ous notat10nal convent10ns, 
A +E =Z 
A-E=X 
A·E = lE 
A2 + E2 = Z 
A2 _ E2 = X 
A2·E2 = lEq , etc, 
7 Jones (1961), p. 48-9. The c1a ssical locus ror Frnncis Baco n's vlews on lan guage is the 
Nouum organum , aphoris ms 43, 59, and 60. H. Pycior makes rererence to Bacon in rcla-
tion to the "symbolical" algebra of\V. Oughtrcd and Wallis, although she does not points to 
the moral content in Wall is's position; scc Pycior (1997), p. 46, 12l. 
8 Wallis (1685), p. [4 J. As Pycior has shown, thi5 idea was already prominent in Oughtred; 
see Pycior (1997 ), p. 40ff. 
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by stressing that they "do save a gr eat Circumlocution of words (each 
letter serving instead of a Definition;)". With such conventions, says 
Wallis, Oughtred manages to have "a great deal of very good Geometry 
brought into a very narrow room" (Wallis, 1685 : 67). Abbreviation of 
long expressions and use of "marks", "notes" or "signs" that speak "to 
the eye" and aid the memory are the main virtues ofWallis's algebra ic 
notations: 
"[such notations] Ioften find very useful .. . for assisting the Fancy, and 
easing the Memory, and bringing the whol e Process to as narrow a 
prospect as may be; which thereby becomes intelligible, with more much 
ease than when involved in a multitude ofWords, and long Pedphrases". 
(Wallis, 1685 : 68). 
Wallis is weU aware that algebraic notations have al so the advantage 
of being "genera l" 01' "abstract", which means that they apply to lines, fig-
ures and to any other quanti ties (WaHis, 1685 : 69, 298-9). Yet, when he 
opposes algebraic notations to geometric demonstrations he never c1aims 
that they constitute a superior language. In keeping with 17th-century 
theories of language, he consistently emphasizes that algebraic nota-
tions make easier the unadulterated access of mathematlcal ideas and 
judgments to the mind by elirninating words and streamlining language 
generally. Rather than new kinds of words, algebraic notations are con-
sidered graphic tricks that elimin ate words and "long periphrases" 
because they convey ideas through the "eye" directly to the mind. Wallis 
stresses the shorthand quality ofhis notations by demanding that they 
remind the reader of the quantities they represent (Wallis, 1685 : 68). 
In 1654 Wallis's colleague 8eth Ward (1617-1689), then the 8avilian 
Professor of Astronomy in Oxford, elaborated the standard view on the 
a lgebraic style in the context of th e so-call ed Webster-Wa rd deba te.9 
Wallis and Ward, along with Boyle, Hooke, Thomas Willis, J ohn Wilkins, 
and others, belonged to the cirele of natural philosophers that met at 
Wadham College, Oxford, in the early 1650s. John Webster (1610-1682) 
\Vas a Puritan minister who had s tudied chemistry and medicine and 
served as sW'geon as we ll as chaplain witb Cromwell 's army. Promoting 
the radical reforro of the universities , in his Academiarurn Exam,en 
(1654) he defended the generali zed introduction of new subjects, such 
as the study of h.ieroglyphics, alchemy, and a lgebra, among other things. 
Besides the interest he had in the foregoi ng subj ects per se, Webster 
elaimed that a ll ofthem involved symbolic languages ofa new kind that 
could be improved by the help of gramm ar. Grammar, al so in need of 
refonn , was defective in not paying to such languages the attention they 
9 On thc debate, sec Debus (1970 ), whích íncJudcs racs ímil e repdnts or WebsLer's 
Acadcmiarum Examen and Ward's Vindiciae Academiarum. 
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deserved. They might in turn be useful to make progress towards a uni-
versal language (Debus, 1970 : 106-8). As a chemical philosopher of 
Hennetic leanings, Webster believed in an Adamic, primordial, natural 
language that had been lost in the faU but could in some measure be 
restored by a deep and pious reform of learn ing (ibid : 110-4). His pam-
phlet found answer in Seth Ward's Vindiciae Academiarum (1654), pref-
aced by John Wilkins, in which Wallis's views on algebra are manifest. 
Ward , assumin g a typ ica l 17th-century philosophy of language , is 
adamant in opposing language and grarnmar to anything involving sym-
bols-and algebraic notations in particular. In fact, symbols and graph-
ic signs he takes to be as incompatible with language as life with death: 
"to say that by introducing [signs], either Grammar or Languages should 
be advanced, it \Vere as mystica ll as to a ffirm e, that the day light is 
advanced by the coming of the night, or that he \Vould kili aman for hi s 
preservation". (Debus, 1970 : 212). 
For one thing, Ward sees the handling 01" hieroglyphics and cryptographic 
devices opposed lo language beca use the aim and main use of such signs 
1S the concealment of information , while language aims to illu strate, 
explicate, and convey intblmation. As for algebra, he uses almost verbatim 
words that Walli s wilI use in his Treatise. Since the main purpose of 
algebraists is to eliminate words, Ward says, it is absurd to put them 
now under th e authority of grarnrn arians. AIgebraic notations were 
meant to eliminate words beca use they enable us "to behold, as it were, 
with OUI' eyes ... [a] long series of ... intricate Ratiocmation". They speak, 
through the eye, directly to the mind, like pictures. Therefore, as Ward 
put it, "[the invention of algebraic symbols] was a designe perfectly 
intended against Language and its servant Grammar." (Debus, 1970 : 
213) The argument holds for algebra as \VeU as for any other use of sym-
bols in philosophy (Ward mentions here the Cabbalists and other schools) 
01' mathematics: if they are useful in improving knowledge it 1S beca use 
they provide an alternative to words, "a shorter, and clearel' cutt to the 
understa nding" (Debus, 1970 : 214). Ward also discusses the notion of a 
"universal language". Interestingly he acknowledges that hi s getting 
acquainted with algebraic notations was what prompted his interest in 
the matter. He envisaged the app]jcation of symbols to the designation 
of all things. First he envisaged it in a direct and simple way which 
I'equired an "almost infini te" number of different symbols, one for each 
existing thing 01' notion, and then in a more soprnsticated way by resolv-
ing words in the most "simple !lotions" and using diffel'ent symbols on ly 
for the "simple notions" (Debus, 1970 : 214-6). In any case, Ward's use of 
symbols was always imagined not as providing a new syntax, but as an 
improvement in the comm unication of pre-existing notions and syllo-
gisms. Ward's views were in all probability discussed with Wallis in the 
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weekly meetings they held at Wadh am College. l'hey show how much 
the rnathematician's understanding of t he role ol' a lgebraic notations 
was shaped by contemporary views on the nature of language. 10 
Proving by algebl'aic notations? 
As we shall see now, Wallis's views on the implications of algebra for 
the philosophy of mathematics are ha rdly consistent, and even his prac-
tice is difficult to conceptualize. On the one hand , Wallis said that the 
introduction of algebra did not fundamentally change mathematical 
objects and demonstrations. As he put it, algebra furnishes convenient 
notations "without altering the manner of demonstration, as to the sub-
s tance" (Wallis, 1685 : [4]). Since a lgebraic notation, according to Wallis, 
was something like a tachigraphy, 01' a series of tricks to abbreviate 
express ion (rather than a language proper), it was not too inconsistent 
for mm to claim that the new symbolic style provided demonstrations 
as good as the classical geometrica l ones, since they were but abbrevia-
tions of, say, Archimedes's. Thus, after proving by incomplete induction 
the formula for the sum oí' the squares of an arithmetical progression 
[I'<k<n k2 = n(n + 1)(2n + 1)/61 , Wall is insisted in stressing that it \Vas 
equiva lent to Proposition 10 of Archimedes's On spirals: "So that 
[Archimedes'sl Proposition is, for substance, the same with mine, though 
otherwise expressed" (Wallis, 1685 : 300)11 Again, a few pages later: "[1] 
represented [c1assical demonstrationsl in a manner more obvious to be 
apprehended." (Wallis (1685), p. 304) In addition , by way of rationa le 
for promoting t he new style, he argued that "beca use as [the demon-
strations] lye in Archimedes, they seem very perplexed; I thus digest-
ed t hem into a brief Synopsis, (that they might th e better be appre-
hended)" (Wallis, 1685 : 30l). Wa llis set forth this idea in other places of 
the Treatise (for instance when introducing Oughtred's symbols, on page 
68), but s tl'essed this idea at its very beginning, in the Preface, when 
he introduced "specious arithmetick" as the art that 
"doth (without altering lhe manner of demonslralion, as lO the substance) 
furni sh li S with a short and convenient way of Notation; whereby the 
whole process of many Operations i5 at once exposed to the Eye in a 
short Synopsis".Wallis (1685), p. [iv]. 12 
10 Pycior also ment.ions the Webster-Ward debat.e when dcaling with Walli s's undcr-
standing or ulgcbra. Not. di scriminating bctween Wa lli s's not.ations and a rull-fl edged 
language, she only round in t.he debate evidence or the "sharp dividing line between the 
old prosc and the scientiFic language advocated by Bacon and his English followcrs" 
(Pycior (1997), p. 115). 
11 The idea was reiterat.ed on puges 299 and 30l. 
12 (emphnsis added). 
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Yet, on the other hand, Wallis was not always consistent with such a 
view, for he used demonstrations that were not classical , nor could be 
cast in c1assical terms. He was most daring in using incomplete induction 
and in taking advantage ofthe formal features ofalgebraic notations. In 
any case, even in such demonstrations we find evidence that Wal1is per-
haps did not realize how powerful a lgebra was bound to be, if un der-
stood as a self-sustaining language. We shall deal mostly with his under-
standing of algebraic demonstrations, where considerations of formal 
and graphical symmetry playa crucial role, but his musings on the intro-
duction of new numbers and new curves by means of algebra deserve a 
brief mention. 
Historia ns ol" mathematics often praise Wallis for his explicit defen se of 
negative and imaginary numbers, which is taken as evidence that he 
was promoting algebra against geornetry. As we have shown elsewhere, 
however, WalHs's discussed such novel quanti ties to show that the han-
dling of such iTílaginary quantities IS not "eithel' Unuseful or "bsurd; 
when rightly understood." (W'allis, 1685 : 265). 13 Wallis's a rguments do 
not involve a defense ofsuch new numbersper se. He does not vindicate 
the fí'eedom ofthe mathematical mind to create new objects (numbers in 
this case) out of the formal power of the language of algebra. Rather to 
the contrary, he acknowledgos explicitly that strictly s peaking such 
quantities make no sense in themselves. When "defending" them, Wallis 
on ly points to specific problems in which sorne geometrical and physical 
interpretations of such quantities are highly usefu1. One of his exam-
pIes is that if we win to the sea a square surface of 1600 square perch-
es, its s i de is 40 perches, but ir we lose it to sea, we have no\V - 1600 
square perches, whose side may be represented by v'=l600 (Wa ll is, 1685: 
265). There are a few other examples, but the point is a lways that by 
adding explanations to fami liar and "real" situations, and by "reading" 
geometrical problems from sorne unusual perspective, "imposslble" quan-
tities may have sorne meaning and may help the mathematician by pro-
viding a measw'e of the "impossibi lity" invo]ved in the problem (Wallis , 
1685 : 264-72). 
Wall is's considerations on the nature of curves defined algebraically are 
even more interesti ng. In t he 1650s, after the publication ol" WalJis's 
Arithmetica infinitorum (1656), William Neil published the firs t rectifi-
cation of a curve. Following a hint in Wallis's book, Neil showed that 
finding the are of semi-cubic parabolas (which we write today i<y2 = x') 
could be r educed to finding the qu a dratul"e of (s imple) pa rabolas 
(Whiteside, 1960 : 328-30). Wallis, \Vho was a lways ready to magnify 
the ach ievements of English mathematicians, is surprisingly tepid in 
rus appraising ofNeil's rectification. The reason is, as he explains in a let-
13 Scc A. Mnlct, "Notions ofnumber, 1585·1685", forthcoming. 
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ter to the secretary of the Royal Society, Heruy Oldenburg, that semi-eubic 
para bolas are not curves to be taken seriously. They are merell' defined 
by an algebl'aic equation. Surely, we can draw them by means of the 
equations, but have no other recognizable properties. Such curves, which 
are devised purposefuUl' taking into aceount the properties oftheir defin-
ing equation, are curves that mathematicians should not care too much 
about, Wallis says. They are not interesting in themselves and deserve 
not to be taken seriously because they lack their own geometric prop-
erties. Wallis mentioned the cycloid as an example of"recognized curves" 
whose studl' (i.e., whose rectification, quadratw·e, and so on) desen'ed the 
IUghest praise and the fulI attention of the besl mathematieians. 14 WalUs's 
views are tantamount lo saying that the algebraie definition of cm·ves has 
no mathematical i.nterest--or to be more precise, that such curves whose 
definition is but an algebraic equation have no mathematical signifi-
canee. We have evidence that Wallis's vicws on curves were no idiosyn-
eratic. We find them almost verbatim in a letter of Christiaan Hul'gens 
to Leibniz as late as in 1691. Huygens criticizes the "contriving" (forger) 
of cm'ves, meaning the invention of curves whose a lgebraic equations 
ensure them certain properties. And he criticizes also the study of such 
curves, which have no other uti lity than showing how to solve some 
exercises. Such cw'Ves not worth the serious mathematician's attention, 
Huygens opposes to the curves that are truly interesting: 
"J e ne voudroisjamais m'amuser a ces differentes natw'es de chaines, que 
Mr. Jo. Bernouilly propose ... II Y a de certaines lignes courbes que la 
nature presente souvent a notre vue, et qu'e lle decrit pour a insi dire 
elle mesme, lesquelles j'estime digne de consideration, et qui d'ordinaü'e 
renferrnent plusiew's proprietez remarquables, com IJon voit au Cerc1e. 
aux Sections coniques, él la CycloideJ ... " 
In the preparatory draft for the letter, Huygens adds: "De telles lignes 
melitent . . . quJon se les pro pose pour exercice, mais non pas celles qu'on 
forge de nouveau seu lement pour y employer le caleul geometrique." In 
the final version the rnessage is the same, cornplemented with a reference 
(a lso negative) to algebraic problems in number theory15 As we shall 
see presenUy, Wallis also dismissed the a lgebraic problems in higher 
arithmetic as a ñ'ivolous divertimento. 
Wallis's reftections on algebraic demonstrations were mostly prompted 
by Fermat's harsh, pointed criticism to hi s demonstr ations in hi s 
Arithmetica infinitorwn, sorne of which include incornplete induction. 
14 Wallis lo Oldcnburg, 4 Oclober 1673, in Hall and Hall (1965· 1986), X, p. 280. 
15 Thc lettcr reads: "Mais d'cn forgcr de nou vc lles, seulcmcnt pour y excrccr Sl! gcometrie. 
sans y prevoir d'autre utilité, il me scmble que c'esl clifficiles agitare nugas, etj'ay la mesme 
opinion de tous les problemes touchant les nombres." Sce Huygens lo Leibniz, 1 Seplcmber 
1691, in Huygens (I888· 1950), X, p. 128, 132·3. 
18 Granos, 5·6, 5-24 
Algebra as language: Wallis and Condillac Otl lile nature of algebm 
That is to say, they involve the para meter n, integer > O, and Walli s 
"proves" them by checking the truth ofthe result for small values of n and 
by a na lyzing the reasons why the result is true. Critiques to Wallis's 
methods and answers to them traveled in letters that WalLis gathered and 
published in book fOlm shortly thereafter as Commercium epistolieum ... 
l nter Nobilissimos Viros [Lord Brouncher, Fermat, Frenicle, Wallis, van 
Seltooten, et al.] (1658). Fermat and sorne ofhis fTi ends (Frenicle acting 
most ofthe time as Fermat's rnouthpiece) were adamant in denying the 
status of demonstra tions to many arguments Wallis used there to sup-
port his main results. Their objections pointed to Walli s 's incomplete 
induction , but also extended to the use of "analytical formul ae", which 
they opposed to the eleganee of Euclid , Apollonius, and c1assical math-
ematics generally.16 Anticipating the idea that was to reappear in his 
T,.eatise of Algebra, Wallis's answer stressed that hi s demon strations 
were most appropriated to illuminate the way in which he gained the 
results. Rather than to admire Archimedes for his elegant demonstra-
tions, says Wallis, we should blame him for hiding his method ofinves-
tigationl 7 
The other dominant theme in the Fermat-Wa llis exchange was their 
sharply contrasting views about (what we nowadays call) number theo-
ry. Fermat's eager and repeated invitations fol' Wallis to join him in his 
al;thmetical researches were not only declined but the researches them-
selves dismissed as useless and unimportant (Wallis, 1658 : 761, 782). 
Fermat and Frenicle rejoined that results in higher mathematics have 
no mechan.ical uses, and that only the lower, easier, and less prestigious 
parts of mathematics were used in sul'veying, gauging, and similar jobs. 
They forcefulJy set forth the notion that mathematical truths must be pur-
sued for their subtlety and perfection , and because it is most fitting for 
the human mind to look after the pure truth, no matter in what subject 
it happens to be embodied-to no avail (Wallis, 1658 : 810-1, 858, 835, 
840). Wallis's (and van Schooten's, Hudde's and Huygens's among others) 
unwi11ingness to get ¡nto number theory, therefore, was a consequence of 
an implicit philosophy ofmathematics shared with many other influen-
tia! mathematicians ofhis time. In this phiJosophy, the algebraic style \Vas 
important ir it could be used to solve certain famili es of problems of a 
geometrical sort. When the development of algebra depended on attack-
ing problems that Wallis and company deemed not to be important 
enough, algebra was left aside. 
It is time now to di scuss the inherent limitations algebraic demonstra-
1(i For details on Wullis's incomplete indu ction, see Scott (938), p. 35·60 . 'I'hc debate is 
found in Wa llis (1658) (also printed in Fermat (1894 ·1912». For Fcrmnt's criticism, see 
Wall is (1658), p. 76 1,858; see al so Fermat's "Remarqu es sur l'o.rithmétique des ¡nfinis du 
S. J. Walli s", in Formal ( 1894-1912), n, p. 347·353. 
17 \Vall is (1658). p. 777·789, particularly 781-782. 
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tions had according to Wallis. Many years after the origina l exchange 
of vie\Vs prompted by the Arithmetica infinitorum, and when Fermat 
had been dead for rnany years as \Vell , Wa llis carne back to Fermat's 
cri ticism in rus 'Irealise of Algebra - proof of how impOltant the issue was 
to him. The least that can be sa id a bout Wa ll is's vie\Vs on a lgebraic 
demonstrations as set forth in t he 1l-eatise is that they are ha rdly con-
sistent. As we saw, repeating his forme!' answer to Fermat, Wa[ljs c1aimed 
that aJgebra (and its adjunct, incomplete induction) was a tool for mak-
ing discoveries, as opposed to producing proofs, and that it should be 
appreciated according to it. Yet , he a lso claimed that a lgebra was not 
essentia lJy or fundamentalJy modifying the structure and arguments of 
e1assical mathematics. As \Ve sha ll see, \Vhat lies behind these conflict-
ing e1a ims is that Wa llis a pparently \Vas not in fulJ possession of th e 
notion of what we call now a form al demonstration . 
Wallis ilJustrated bis views with examples that provide e1ear evidence of 
what 1 call the formal weakness of Wallis's a lgebra ic notations. In page 
307 ofhis 'Ireatise he printed the 8lTays: 
° ° 
o o o 
I I I 1 1 
I o 1 Z 1 <5 [ 1+ 1 30 
I l ° "] 6 15 36 3' 110 
2. o + 2. 8 12 16 10 ~ 3
' 
110 2fO 
1 5 o [9 6 6¡ 60 2 11 390 120 
l o 9 2 27 18 Sr 110 1+ :>..fl no ¡60 
[ "] o n 6 1"]1 8f lS1 7 10 110 
4 o 16 2. 6.¡ "-i 2f4 191- "-i 101+ 1310 +80 
1 9 ° 6[ 6 369 [oS ~IOI 1230 120 
f e :11' :& [:&f 30 61' 3° 2 "4 jl2! >'110 6QO 
J 1.1 0 91 6 6;,. [32 1411 18lo 
6 O l6 2 2.16 l6 12.94 +31- 7776 +3'0 
1 1l 1>.7 1.105 903 1 
"] +9 343 2401 16807 
They feature the natural numbers (1, 2, 3,) and t heir difIerences; their 
squares (1, 4, 9,) and their 1st- and 2d-order differences; their cubes and 
a ll their differences, and so on and so forth . Wallis remarks that the last 
equal differences follow an obvious law. Then he poses himself the rhetor-
ica l question, "Is it possible to prove such law genera l1 y?" The remark-
able answer is highly instructive. Accol'ding to Wallis, the "observation" 
(sic) of the 8lTays themselves is enough to convince anybody of such 
result: 
"Such observation would be looked upon, as sufficiently instructive; since 
t here is no reason of Suspicion, why it should not so continual1y pro-
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eeed: But [there isl reason rather to believe, that there is, in the nature 
ofNumber, a suffieient ground ofsueh sequel". 
Wallis goes on then to explain that a "large treatise" eould be fill ed \Vith 
a jlsolemn Process of Demonstr ation" proving the resuIt fOl" the a rith-
metiea l progression of natura l numbers (1, 2, 3, .. .l, and then for the 
squar es of thern , and so on: 
"And at length eonelude (for to that he must come at least, un less he 
would be infinite,) That \Ve have reason to judge in Iike rnanner, of con-
sequent Powers, (whieh con eludes t he induetion)". (WaIlis, 1685 : 307). 
We can do nothing, aeeording to Wallis, to prove in genera l the rule that 
we Ilobserve" in the foregoing an'ays. As Wallis explains, all the best and 
rnost demanding mathematician can do here ls a complete demonstration 
fOl" euery power, h, in the series lnkJlI , In other words, Wallis seems to 
have no eoneeption of what would be an a lgebra ie proof for this general 
series that has k as a parameter. Yet , Wallis has no doubts about the 
truth and generality of the result and claims them to be obviously derived 
from the study of the foregoing aITays. The souree for his eonfidenee is to 
be found in the graphie disposition of the symbolie alTays. Wallis pereeives 
in them all the hints he needs to generalize his observations, while he ean-
not imagine the formal mechanism that provides what \Ve call nowa-
days an a rgument by complete induetion. 
In providing more examples to fully explain his position, Wallis deals 
with the powers of a binomial by means of the following array: 





IdlS. 5 .... e ~1I,'e' 
Ua 4A na e I fA'e' 
14 3da e 1 0 4'(1 u .... e' 
~/" 6dllee 2oa't'1 
1 t 34 U IOall'~ Ha' r4 
YI! ~ 4Att t If4'''' 
Ut e 5 .... 214 2(' 
It t tt 6ae' 
1 e' 7at' 
U· 
,,' 
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First, he states the form ation laws for this table: (1) any coefficient in the 
table is t he sum of the two coeffici ents anteceding it; (2) the powers of a 
and e appearing in any term are the ones appearing in the 2 terms of 
the foregoing colurnn anteceding it. His comments on what this array 
means for the powers a + e are worthwhile quoting in fuI!. He allows 
that any specific power can be demonstrated algebraica l1y (by "specious 
multiplication"), and stresses that the production of the fil'st powers and 
the observation of the anay they produced is usually assurned to be a con-
clusive demonstration: 
"Now each ofthese s teps, [meaning (a + e)2, (a + e)3, and so on] may be 
singly demonstrated by a Specious Multiplica ti on of a + e into itself, 
which will produce the Square ... ; and then ofthis into a + e, which \Viii 
produce the Cube .. . : and so onwal'd, (by con tinual Induction.) But most 
Mathern aticians that 1 have seen, after such Induction continued for 
sorne few Steps, ... are satisfied (from such evidence,) to conclude uni-
versally, and so in lille manner {or the consequent Powers. And such 
Induction hath been hitherto thought .. . a conclusive Argument". (p. 
308). (Emphasis in the original). 
What would the answer be, for anyone not satisfied with such an argu-
ment? Interestingly, Wallis a lso says that he cannot think of a general 
proof for the development of(a + eY'. The onJy alternative Wallis can th.ink 
ofis to "continue the Process (by continual Multiplication into a + e,) as fal' 
as they please; and then content themselves ... with. a particular conclu-
sion (for they prove no more,) that it holds true as to so many steps; and rest 
there."19 Therefore, Wallis sees no real alternative to his "inductions" 
based on the regularity of algebraic notations. To quote him once more, 
any "incluctive" demonstration ol' bis 
"1 always pursue so far (by regular demonstration .. . ) til1 it lead me into 
a regular ... Process; ... And without this, we must be content to rest at 
particulars (in all such kind of Process,) without proceeding to the 
Generalls". (Ernphasis in the origina l). 
By way of conclusion let me stress that the weakness of Wallis's a lgebra 
qua form allanguage is ful1y consistent \Vith his emphasis on algebra as 
a tool of discovery. But it is also consistent with his view that algebra 
does not produce "new" demonstrations, 01' that algebra does not alter 
the substance of the classical demonstrations. Finally, and perhaps more 
significantly, such a weakness is also consistent with the notion that a1ge-
bra was a tachigraphy that "con den sed" mathematical arguments and 
"offered them at one glance". In Wallis, algebl'aic notations work thl'Ough 
the visual display of syrnmetries and regulal'ities. It \Vas such graphic 
qualities of his notations that played a crucial role in the new algebraic 
style ofthe 17th century. Notyet a fully self-sustaining formallanguage, 
algebra ic notations were more like an a lphabet than a language, and as 
such, considerations of syrnmetry and design could not be avoided. 
22 Cronos, 5-6, 5-24 
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